It’s been noticeable that Manchester City have adopted a new shape this year. We’ve seen cracks, and it’s taken a while for the players to understand the 3-box-3 system. As well as Man City adapting, the other Premier League sides have had to develop new ways of defending against them. Here’s how a few teams have done it.

Crystal Palace:

Following their 4-2 loss at the Etihad Stadium earlier this year, Crystal Palace recently hosted Man City with a much-improved plan. Patrick Vieira’s side have played a 4-2-3-1 throughout his tenure. This has proved quite an effective formation with which to press against the 3-box-3 — mainly from what we’ve seen of Barcelona’s opponents and those who’ve caused City the most problems.

Palace’s defensive midfielders split wide to mark City’s attacking midfielders. These players are often ignored when teams press against City, but the double-pivot allowed Palace to eliminate them as a threat between the lines. One winger and the No10 would mark south-side of City’s double-pivot. These two players are always City’s primary route past the first line of pressure, so man-marking them caused immediate issues for Pep Guardiola’s defenders. The spare winger would be crucial. Whichever side they were on determined which direction Palace’s striker would encourage City to play by bending his run.

When the ball went to the wide centre-back, Palace’s spare winger could press them, blocking passing lanes behind, and every other short passing option was marked too.

When City overcame Palace’s pressing trap, they looked semi-dangerous, but this was rare, especially in the first half.

Liverpool:

Sticking with the theme of an initial press, Liverpool used a 4-4-2, which could morph into a 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1 when City played to the wide centre-backs.

Harvey Elliott played on the right, with Mohamed Salah becoming a striker with Roberto Firmino. These two stayed north-side of City’s double-pivot, blocking the passing lanes while still applying pressure to the centre-backs. The four-man midfield shielded behind them, offering a nominal wide player on both sides to engage with the ball carrier if City played wide. This prevented Man City’s central players from being involved in build-up, leaving just the two spare defenders as passing options.

When the ball was played to City’s right-centre-back, Liverpool would transition into a 4-3-3 simply by Diogo Jota at left-midfield pushing up to form a front-three with the two strikers and Harvey Elliott tucking in again to join the midfield. Jota would press, with the midfield-three picking up City’s attacking midfielders. All the while, Salah and Firmino were still blocking the pass to City’s double-pivot.

Kevin de Bruyne, in true mezzala style, tends to pull wide in these situations to offer a passing option, so it was important that Jota’s press guided City back inside again.

If the ball went to the left-centre-back, Liverpool would become a 4-2-3-1, with Firmino becoming a No10 and Jota moving inwards to man-mark. (Note that the only reason Liverpool’s shape was different on either side was simply to place their players in familiar positions. Jota doesn’t play in midfield, so Firmino dropped back instead.)

This whole press was executed well on the day and was designed to prevent City from progressing the ball in the central zones, instead forcing them wide.

Brentford:

Brentford’s 5-3-2 shape was nothing different for them, and they benefited from having played the formation all year. Against City’s 3-box-3, it naturally meant they occupied the areas that City’s players wanted to run into, especially those in the half-spaces. City’s attacking midfielders often use half-runs, but Brentford’s back-three offered natural coverage in the half-spaces. It meant Brentford could man-mark without worrying about City’s movement, because they’d only be moving to another area of the pitch occupied by a red shirt.

Brentford let City have the ball, a lot of it, and focussed on denying space in the areas that City’s players find desirable. In a total paradox, it was essentially man-oriented zonal marking.

Tottenham Hotspur:

Spurs used their classic 5-4-1 shape off the ball to man-mark some players and cut situational passing lanes too. Tottenham’s two centre-midfielders pushed extremely high onto City’s double-pivot, and Harry Kane pressed alone up front. Spurs’ wingers were very narrow, keeping a compact block of five ahead of their back-five. The wingers’ narrow positioning became important when City’s wide centre-backs had the ball, as they’d be blocking a pass to the likes of De Bruyne in attacking midfield.

City had no option but to play out wide to the wingers. However, Spurs’ back-five, like Brentford’s, allowed them to get tighter to City’s wingers. If De Bruyne would peel away and offer a pass infield, Ben Davies could track the run and prevent this pass, knowing there were still two centre-backs on Erling Haaland.